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Interest in fundamental tax reform has
waned since the early months of the 1996 U.S.
presidential campaign when it was the subject
of intense political and media debate. In coming
years, a resurgence of interest seems almost cer-
tain. After all, the Internal Revenue Service
remains unpopular, the U.S. savings rate re-
mains low, and pressure to efficiently raise sub-
stantial new tax revenues will grow once the
baby boom generation reaches retirement age
and federal entitlement spending begins to bal-
loon. Now, while the rhetoric is still somewhat
subdued, may be a good time to review the
impact a major tax overhaul would have on 
the economy.
In this first of two articles on the economic
impact of fundamental tax reform, we describe
a framework useful for analyzing how the adop-
tion of a flat-rate consumption tax would affect
interest rates, the savings decision of a typical
household, and the investment and hiring deci-
sions of a typical firm.
1 We are less concerned
with obtaining precise quantitative estimates of
these effects than we are with establishing their
direction and explaining the forces behind
them. Moreover, our focus throughout is on the
macroeconomic impact of tax reform. We will
largely ignore the issues of who would be likely
to gain most from reform and who might suffer
losses. We take this approach partly because
our analytical framework isn’t well suited to
addressing distributional questions, partly be-
cause the distributional impact of tax reform has
already been adequately discussed elsewhere,
and partly because windfall losses can often be
reduced or eliminated through careful design of
transition rules and the appropriate conduct of
monetary policy.
2 In any event, a tax reform that
succeeds in raising the economy’s growth
potential—even if only temporarily or only by
a small amount—is likely to yield long-run 
net economic benefits to the vast majority of
people. Our hope is that an improved under-
standing of the macroeconomic effects of tax
reform will help readers keep potential short-
term windfall losses in perspective.
Consistent with results obtained by others
in complicated numerical simulation exercises,
our analysis indicates that adoption of a flat-rate
consumption tax can be expected to have an
immediate positive impact on saving and lead,
in the long run, to higher levels of consumption,
wages, and stock prices, and to lower interest
rates. In the short run, however, real interest
rates are likely to rise, and consumption and
real stock prices are likely to fall. These results
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Adoption of a flat-rate
consumption tax can be
expected to have an immediate
positive impact on saving and
lead, in the long run, to higher
levels of consumption, wages,
and stock prices, and to lower
interest rates. In the short run,
however, real interest rates 
are likely to rise, and
consumption and real stock
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analysis ignores international capital flows. Such
flows potentially exert a moderating influence
on consumption and interest rate movements.
However, different countries treat foreign-
source income very differently for tax purposes,
making it difficult to draw general conclusions.
3
Second, we ignore enforcement, avoidance, and
administrative costs. Certainly, tax-reform advo-
cates hope that these costs will fall. However,
the magnitude of the cost savings will depend
greatly on the specifics of how tax reform is
implemented. Opinion is divided over whether
the potential savings are significant. Third, there
is no individual earnings uncertainty in our
model. Consequently, there is no “precaution-
ary” savings motive. Simulations undertaken by
Engen and Gale (1997) and Engen, Gravelle, and
Smetters (1997) suggest that this omission is
more important quantitatively than it is qualita-
tively.
4 Finally, our analysis holds the supply of
labor fixed: we defer discussion of the variable-
work-effort case to a follow-up article, which
will appear in a subsequent issue of Economic
Review. As it turns out, the qualitative effects of
tax reform in an economy with variable work
effort differ little from those derived here—pro-
vided that tax reform leaves the tax rate on labor
income unchanged.
We begin with a review of the basic fea-
tures of the current tax system and three seem-
ingly distinct, but actually equivalent, alternative
types of flat-rate consumption tax. We then
derive equations that characterize the savings
and investment decisions of households and
firms, conditional on the tax system. Each of
these equations has a straightforward graphical
interpretation. Using a set of diagrams, we ana-
lyze first the long-run, then the short-run impact
of tax reform on output, consumption, invest-
ment, and interest rates. As already noted, the
second article in this series achieves additional
realism by extending the basic model to include
variable work effort. Moreover, our second arti-
cle uses simulations to explore the dynamic
effects of tax reform in economies with capital
adjustment costs and long-run growth effects.
ALTERNATIVE TAX SYSTEMS
Overview
The U.S. system of individual income
taxes, payroll taxes, and corporate income taxes
is exceedingly complex, involving numerous
exemptions, deductions, credits, and carry-over
provisions. It taxes different types of income at
different rates, and the marginal tax rate applied
to any given type of income may vary with
income level. It makes no distinction between
real capital gains and capital gains that simply
reflect inflation. Similarly, depreciation allow-
ances are based on nominal book values rather
than replacement values.
We abstract from much of the complexity
of the actual tax code. Thus, we assume that
inflation is low enough that we can ignore its
impact and conduct our analysis entirely in real
terms. We allow wage income, corporate earn-
ings, and interest and dividend income to be
taxed at different rates but assume that the dif-
ferent marginal tax rates applied to these types
of income are independent of the level of
income. Each household feels free to buy and
sell stock and other assets, but because house-
holds are assumed to be identical to one
another, they never have occasion to do so.
Consequently, there are never any realized 
capital gains. Firms’ investment in plant and
equipment is financed entirely from retained
corporate earnings.
5 All corporate earnings not
used to finance investment or pay taxes are dis-
tributed to households as dividends. Although
these assumptions may seem extreme, for our
purposes they simply strip the current tax sys-
tem down to its essential features.
The alternative tax system that we analyze
differs from the present system in two respects.
First, it would replace the current hodgepodge
of tax rates—under which some types of in-
come are taxed more than once—with an inte-
grated, flat-rate system of taxation. Second, it
would base taxation on consumption rather
than income.
There are three different versions of the
flat-rate consumption tax: the national retail
sales tax, the value-added tax (VAT), and the
Hall–Rabushka tax (after which the Armey–
Shelby flat tax was modeled).
6 Under a retail
sales tax, each consumer good is taxed on its
entire value at the time of final sale. No tax is
collected on goods at intermediate stages of
production or distribution. In contrast, a VAT
collects a little piece of tax revenue at each stop
along the production and distribution chain,
based on the amount of value added to the
good at that stop: under a VAT, firms pay tax on
their sales less the sum of their purchases from
other businesses. The Hall–Rabushka tax works
in exactly the same way as a VAT, except each
firm’s employees are paid with pretax dollars,
and it is the employees who write checks to the
government for the taxes due on the wage com-
ponent of value added. (The nonwage compo-
nent of value added—corporate cash flow or
sales less purchases from other businesses less26
wages—continues to be taxable to the firm. See
Gentry and Hubbard 1997 for a nice discussion
of what is included in nonwage value added.)
Effectively, the Hall–Rabushka tax is a value-
added tax where each worker is treated as an
independent contractor. There is substantial
controversy over which of these taxes would be
easiest to implement, in practice (Slemrod
1996). However, for our purposes, all three are
equivalent. For no better reason than that it is
closest in appearance to the current tax system,
we have chosen to model the Hall–Rabushka
flat tax.
Details
We assume that output is produced from
capital (plant and equipment) and labor, subject
to a constant-returns-to-scale production tech-
nology (so that a doubling of all inputs into the
production process doubles output).
7 The con-
stant-returns-to-scale assumption allows us to
measure all quantities on a per-worker basis.
For example, we will use y to denote output
per worker produced by the representative firm,
n to denote hours of employment per worker,
and k to denote capital per worker. Each period,
a certain fraction, d, of existing capital wears 
out and must be replaced if the capital stock is
not to shrink. Net investment (the net change 
in the capital stock from one period to the 
next) will be denoted by Dk. We use w, R, and
r to denote the real before-tax wage, the real
before-tax interest rate, and the real after-tax
interest rate, respectively; while g, b, and Db
denote real government purchases, the real
stock of government bonds outstanding, and
net new government indebtedness, all meas-
ured on a per-worker basis.
We make several simplifying assumptions.
As noted above, in our model economy all 
capital investment is financed from retained
earnings, and all other earnings are paid out
either as taxes or as dividends. There is no role
for government transfer payments in a world
where all households are identical, so we will
ignore them. Within each tax regime, tax rates
are assumed constant through time. There is 
no uncertainty. Finally, tax reform is not
announced in advance.
In our model of the current tax system, the
government applies three different tax rates to
three different types of income. Wage income,
wn, is taxed at rate tw. Corporate profits, y – wn
– dk, are taxed at rate tp. Any after-tax profits
that are not used to finance net new investment
are distributed as dividends and are taxed at the
same rate, td, as is interest income, Rb. Hence,
after-tax dividends are (1 – td)[(1 – tp)(y – wn –
dk) – Dk]. In the United States, the average mar-
ginal federal tax rates on wages and corporate
profits are each about 35 percent, while the 
tax rate on interest (and dividend) income is
roughly 25 percent.
8
Under our alternative tax plan, a single tax
rate, t, is applied to both wage income, wn, and
corporate cash flow, y – wn – dk – Dk. Interest
on newly-issued government debt is tax free.
(To prevent a windfall gain to “coupon clip-
pers,” the interest on bonds that were issued
prior to tax reform would have to remain tax-
able to recipients.) The U.S. Treasury estimates
that implementing the Armey–Shelby version of
the Hall–Rabushka tax system would require a
22.4 percent average marginal tax rate on labor
income (Auerbach 1996). Replacing the revenue
from the current federal payroll tax would bring
this tax rate up to a level roughly comparable 
to the rates of wage and profit taxation under
the current system—that is, approximately 35
percent.
9
We can use the government budget con-
straint to see the connection between the cur-
rent tax system and our flat-rate alternative. In
our stylized model of the current system, the
government budget constraint is given by
(1) Db = g + rb – {twwn + tp(y – wn – dk)
Wage taxes              Profits taxes
+ td[(1 – tp)(y – wn – dk) – Dk]}.
Dividend taxes
This equation simply says that the government
must issue more debt whenever its expendi-
tures (on goods and services, and net interest)
exceed the revenue it receives from taxing
wage, profit, and dividend income. In an econ-
omy with a flat-rate consumption tax, in con-
trast, the government budget constraint takes
the form
(2) Db = g + rb – [twn + t(y – wn – dk – Dk)]
Wage taxes              Cash flow taxes
= g + rb – t(y – dk – Dk)
= g + rb – t(c + g),
where c = y – dk – Dk – g and denotes real con-
sumption expenditures. Note that imposing a
uniform tax on wage income and corporate
cash flow is equivalent to taxing the sum of
household and government spending on goods
and services.
We stated above that one can think of our
alternative tax plan as being two steps removed
from the current tax system. The first step takes
us from the current system to an integrated, flat-
rate income tax. In our model, this step isFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       27 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 1998
accomplished by setting td = 0 (eliminating the
double taxation of corporate earnings) and tw =
tp º t¢. Equation 1 reduces to
(1¢) Db = g + rb – t¢(y – dk).
Note the similarity between Equation 1¢ and the
second line of Equation 2. To complete the
move from our current income tax system to 
a flat-rate consumption tax requires only the
additional step of allowing firms to deduct all
purchases of plant and equipment, not just
depreciation on existing plant and equipment,
before calculating their tax liability.
10
UTILITY AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we discuss the implications
that utility and profit maximization have for the
relationship between the variables in our model
economy. This discussion lays the necessary
groundwork for all of our subsequent analysis.
To keep the model as simple as possible, we
assume that there are no capital adjustment
costs and that the supply of labor is exoge-
nously fixed. These assumptions are relaxed in
the sequel to this article.
The Household Savings Decision
The optimality conditions of the represen-
tative household equate the rate at which the
household is willing to trade one good for
another (the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween the goods) to the relative market prices
of the goods. For example, suppose that we
denote by MRS(ct, ct + 1) the number of units of
consumption at time t + 1 required to compen-
sate the representative household for the loss of
one unit of consumption at time t. Moreover,
suppose that rt denotes the after-tax interest rate
at time t (so that rt = (1 – td)Rt under the cur-
rent tax system and rt = Rt after tax reform).
Then only when 1 + rt = MRS(ct, ct + 1) will the
household’s allocation of consumption across
time be optimal.
11 Graphically, the household
will allocate consumption so as to be at a point
of tangency between its intertemporal budget
constraint and one of its indifference curves
(Figure  1).
It is standard to assume that the marginal
rate of substitution is decreasing in its first argu-
ment and increasing in its second argument. 
In the present case, this condition means that
households tend to prefer smooth consump-
tion paths to uneven ones. (The indifference
curves in Figure 1 are convex to the origin.)
Also, households respond to an increase in
wealth by demanding more current and future
consumption. (A parallel outward shift in the
household budget line shifts the point of 
tangency between the budget line and the
household’s indifference curves to the north-
east.) It is also standard to assume that MRS(ct,
ct + 1) = 1 + r, for some fixed r > 0, whenever
ct = ct + 1. (The representative household’s indif-
ference curves have slope –(1 + r) where they
cross a 45° line extending out from the origin.)
The parameter r is the household’s pure rate of
time preference.
From our assumptions about household
preferences, it follows immediately that MRS(ct,
ct + 1) > 1 + r if, and only if, ct + 1 > ct. However,
we have already seen that an optimizing house-
hold will equate the marginal rate of substi-
tution between current and future consumption
to one plus the after-tax interest rate. Hence,
(3) ct + 1 > ct
Û MRS(ct, ct + 1) > 1 + r
Û rt > r.
In words, consumption will be rising through
time if, and only if, the real after-tax interest rate
exceeds the pure rate of time preference.
Intuitively, a high after-tax rate of return on sav-
ing is needed to induce households to defer
consumption.
The Business Investment Decision
The optimality conditions that characterize
the representative firm’s investment decision are
different under a consumption tax than they are
under the current income tax system. We look
first at the income tax case, then turn our atten-
tion to the consumption tax case.
Figure 1
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Investment Under an Income Tax. Under an
income tax system, after-tax dividends are
(4) (1 – td)[(1 – tp)(y – wn – dk) – Dk].
Hence, increasing period-t investment by one
unit requires that period-t dividends be cut by
(1 – td) units. If used to purchase government
bonds, these (1 – td) units of period-t output
would yield (1 + rt)(1 – td) units of output in
period t + 1. The firm should continue to in-
crease its capital investment as long as it can
give shareholders a better marginal return than
they would receive under this fallback strategy.
With one additional unit of capital avail-
able in period t + 1, the firm’s production will
be higher than would otherwise have been the
case, but so will its depreciation costs. On net,
taxable profits rise by MPk – d, where MPk
denotes the marginal product of capital—the
increment to production from an additional unit
of capital. After-tax profits rise by (1 – tp)(MPk –
d). Moreover, because it increased capital
investment in period t, the firm will be able 
to avoid one unit of capital investment in period
t + 1. Thus, altogether, the firm will be able 
to increase period t + 1 dividends by 1 + (1 –
tp)(MPk – d) units of output if it increases cur-
rent investment by one unit. Of course, only the
fraction (1 – td) of these dividends will be avail-
able to shareholders after taxes.
Summarizing, when it increases period-t
investment by one unit, the firm deprives its
shareholders of (1 + rt)(1 – td) units of output
in period t + 1 and, in exchange, gives them 
(1 – td)[1 + (1 – tp)(MPk – d)] units of output. A
profit-maximizing firm will expand investment
until the marginal return to investment just
equals the marginal cost of investment:
(1 – td)[1 + (1 – tp)(MPk – d)] = (1 + rt)(1 – td),
or, equivalently,
(5) (1 – tp)(MPk – d) = rt.
Thus, under the current income tax system,
firms invest up to the point where the marginal
product of capital net of depreciation and incre-
mental profits taxes equals the after-tax interest
rate.
Investment Under a Consumption Tax. Under
the Hall–Rabushka version of the flat-rate con-
sumption tax, after-tax dividends are
(4¢) (1 – t)(y – wn – dk – Dk).
Hence, the opportunity cost of capital invest-
ment is (1 – t) units of period-t output or, equiv-
alently, (1 – t)(1 + rt) units of output in period
t + 1. The marginal, after-tax return to capital
investment is (1 – t)(MPk + 1 – d) units of out-
put in period t + 1. (The firm has MPk additional
units of newly produced output to sell in period
t + 1, plus used equipment worth 1 – d units of
output.) Therefore, the marginal return to
investment just equals the marginal cost of
investment when
(1 – t)(MPk + 1 – d) = (1 – t)(1 + rt)
or, equivalently, when
(5¢) MPk – d = rt.
Under the consumption tax, firms invest up to
the point where the net-of-depreciation mar-
ginal product of capital equals the real interest
rate.
The Output Market
Of course, business investment and house-
hold savings decisions are not independent of
one another. They are linked by the require-
ment that the sum of consumption, investment,
and government purchases equals the total
amount of output produced. Formally, we must
have f (k, n0) = c + dk + Dk + g, where f (·, ·)
gives the amount of output produced per
worker as a function of the amount of capital
per worker and the number of hours of employ-
ment per worker (held fixed at n0). Turning this
equation around,
(6) Dk = f (k, n0) – c – g – dk.
Hence,
(7) Dk > 0 Û c < f (k, n0) – g – dk.
Equation 7 simply states that the capital stock
will increase when consumption is low relative
to production (net of government purchases
and depreciation) and will decrease when con-
sumption is high relative to production. In the
former case, there is more than enough output
available, after deducting household and gov-
ernment consumption, to replace plant and
equipment as it wears out. In the latter case, so
much output is being consumed that firms are
unable to replace worn-out plant and equip-
ment. One can think of f (k, n0) – g – dk as
being the level of consumption that is sustain-
able, given the capital stock and the level of
government purchases.
The Labor Market
Finally, consider the labor market. As
noted above, we assume that the supply of
labor is fixed at n = n0. The demand for labor
is determined by profit maximization. The rep-
resentative firm will demand additional labor asFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       29 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 1998
long as the incremental labor adds more to 
revenues (through increased production) than it
adds to costs (through increased wages). Under
either tax system, the increment to revenues is
simply the marginal product of labor—denoted
by MPn—and the increment to costs is simply
the real wage, w. Hence, profit maximization
implies that
(8) MPn = w.
The marginal product of labor must equal the
real wage.
THE EFFECTS OF TAX REFORM: THE LONG RUN
In this section, we develop a set of dia-
grams that summarizes the optimality and mar-
ket-clearing conditions we derived above. We
use this set of diagrams to analyze the long-run
impact of a flat-rate consumption tax on con-
sumption, the capital stock, and interest rates.
We also consider the long-run impact of tax
reform on wages and the stock market. All dis-
cussion of the transition from one long-run
equilibrium to another is deferred until later in
the article.
The Demand for Capital and the 
Long-Run Supply of Capital
Our model economy abstracts from any
source of sustained growth, such as technologi-
cal change. Consequently, the long-run equilib-
rium in our model will be characterized by a
constant level of consumption and a constant
capital stock. We already know (from Equation
3) that households will be content with a con-
stant level of consumption if, and only if, the
after-tax interest rate equals the pure rate of
time preference: rt = r. Thus, there is only one
after-tax interest rate consistent, in the long run,
with the optimality condition that governs
household saving decisions: as shown in the
bottom panel of Figure 2, the long-run capital-
supply curve is horizontal at the pure rate of
time preference.
The capital-demand curve differs depend-
ing on the tax regime. According to the invest-
ment-optimality condition for a firm subject to a
corporate income tax (Equation 5), the real
after-tax interest rate that will just induce the
representative firm to hold a given quantity of
capital is (1 – tp)(MPk – d). Assuming that the
marginal product of capital is decreasing in the
capital stock, this optimality condition defines a
downward-sloping relationship between r and
k. See the gray line plotted in the bottom panel
of Figure 2.
Under a flat-rate consumption tax, the
investment-optimality condition is Equation 5¢.
It says that the representative firm will add 
to its capital stock up to the point where net-
of-depreciation marginal product of capital 
just equals the after-tax interest rate. So now 
the critical interest rate is MPk – d rather than 
(1 – tp)(MPk – d). The capital demand curve is
still downward sloping, but it is proportionately
higher than the capital demand curve under the
income tax. See the blue line plotted in the bot-
tom panel of Figure 2.
The Long-Run Impact of Tax Reform
Long-run equilibrium in the capital market
occurs where the capital-demand and capital-
supply schedules intersect. In the bottom panel
of Figure 2, this intersection occurs at point E
in the economy with a corporate income tax,
and at point E¢ in the economy with a flat-rate
consumption tax. The after-tax interest rate is
the same in the two economies, but the econ-
omy with the consumption tax has a larger
steady-state capital stock—for realistic parame-
ter values, 29 percent higher. (See the box titled
“A Numerical Example” on page 37.) A higher
capital stock means more output—roughly 9
percent more than under an income tax.
12
What of the pretax interest rate? In steady
state under either tax system, we know that r = r.
Under a consumption tax, households do not
pay tax on their interest income. So R = r = r
under a consumption tax. Under an income 
tax, in contrast, interest is taxed at rate td, so 
R =r/(1 – td) = r/(1 – td). Thus, the steady-state
pretax interest rate is lower (by about 25 per-
cent) under a consumption tax than under an
income tax.
What of the stock market value of the typ-
ical firm? Under a consumption tax, each addi-
tional unit of capital investment costs
shareholders 1 – t units of current after-tax div-
idends (Equation 4¢). Hence, each unit of capi-
tal is worth 1 – t units of consumption at the
margin, and the real value of the firm is (1 – t)k.
Over time, this value approaches (1 – t)kE¢,
where  kE¢ is the steady-state capital stock. Under
an income tax, each unit of capital investment
costs shareholders 1 – td units of current after-
tax dividends (Equation 4). So the real value of
the firm is (1 – td)kE in steady state. Whether tax
reform ultimately raises or ultimately lowers
stock prices is, in general, ambiguous. The cap-
ital stock is clearly higher after reform, but the
tax rate applied to corporate cash flow after re-
form might also very well be higher than the cur-
rent tax rate on dividends. (Recall that td » 0.25,30
whereas replacing the revenues from the cur-
rent income and payroll tax systems, while
allowing for some initial amount of wage
income to be tax exempt, requires t » 0.35.) As
noted above, realistic parameter values suggest
that the steady-state capital stock is almost 29
percent higher under a consumption tax than
under an income tax. Consequently, it is rea-
sonable to expect that real stock prices would
ultimately increase by a little less than 12 per-
cent as a result of tax reform.
What of the pretax wage? From profit
maximization, we know that the wage rate
equals the marginal product of labor (Equation
8). With a constant-returns-to-scale production
technology, the marginal product of labor
depends only on the capital/labor ratio. Since
the steady-state capital stock is higher under a
consumption tax than under an income tax, the
same must be true of steady-state labor produc-
tivity and the steady-state real wage. For realis-
tic parameter values, the real wage rises by
about 9 percent in the long run.
We know that consumption is constant in
the long-run equilibrium of our model economy
—but constant at what level? We can use the
top panel of Figure 2 to find out. This panel
shows a plot of the function f (k, n0) – g – dk,
Figure 2
Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Long-Run Equilibria
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which we know from our discussion of the 
output-market clearing condition (Equation 7) 
is the formula for the maximum sustainable
level of consumption. In plotting sustainable
consumption, we have assumed that capital is
necessary for producing output (f (0, n0) = 0)
and that the net marginal product of capital
(MPk –  d =  f1(k,  n0) – d) is positive at low levels
of capital and decreasing in the quantity of 
capital. Consequently, the y – g – dk curve has
vertical intercept –g and an inverted-U shape. It
attains its maximum when the marginal product
of capital equals the depreciation rate (f1(k, n0)
– d = 0).
To find the steady-state level of consump-
tion graphically, we need only move upward
from points E and E ¢ in the lower panel of
Figure 2 to the corresponding points along 
the curve plotted in the upper panel. Since the
y – g – dk curve is necessarily upward sloping
over the relevant range, a higher steady-state
capital stock implies a higher steady-state level
of consumption. In the diagram, the steady-state
level of consumption under the consumption
tax (cE¢) is greater than the steady-state level of
consumption under the income tax (cE).
To review, the key difference between an
income tax and a consumption tax is that the
former does not allow firms to expense their
capital investment. (Compare Equations 4 and
4¢, or Equations 1¢ and 2.) Consequently, the
trade-off between current dividends and future
dividends is distorted under an income tax:
shareholders have a bias in favor of current 
dividends that is lacking under a consumption
tax. (Compare Equations 5 and 5¢.) This bias 
drives firms to demand less capital, at any given
after-tax interest rate, than they would under a
consumption tax. Because the after-tax interest
rate must, in steady state, equal the pure rate of
time preference, the capital stock ends up at a
lower level under an income tax. Since the
steady-state capital stock is lower under an in-
come tax, so are steady-state output and steady-
state consumption.
THE EFFECTS OF TAX REFORM: DYNAMICS
So far we have considered only the long-
run effects of tax reform. If we are interested in
the path of the economy between steady states,
we must modify our graphical apparatus.
Fortunately, the required changes are not
large—our new diagram is quite similar to
Figure 2. However, because interactions be-
tween consumption and capital are important in
the short run, the focus of our analysis shifts
away from the bottom panel of the diagram and
to the top panel.
13 We demonstrate that con-
sumption at first must decline following tax
reform to make room for increased investment.
The stock market is also likely to decline, while
interest rates are likely to rise.
The Phase Diagram
Since our interest is in how the U.S. econ-
omy would evolve following tax reform, we
analyze the short-run dynamics of an economy
in which the government relies on a flat-rate
consumption tax to meet its revenue needs.
Consider first the dynamics of consumption.
From Equation 3 (the optimality condition for
household saving) we know that households
are willing to defer consumption if, and only if,
the after-tax interest rate exceeds the pure rate
of time preference. However, from Equation 5¢
(the optimality condition for investment) we
know that for the representative firm to be will-
ing to hold its capital stock, the after-tax interest
rate must equal the net marginal product of cap-
ital. Putting these two conditions together, we
find that consumption will be rising over time if,
and only if, the net marginal product of capital
exceeds the pure rate of time preference:
(9) Dc > 0 Û MPk – d > r.
The bottom panel of Figure 3, much like the
bottom panel of Figure 2, shows a plot of the
net marginal product of capital. Clearly, the net
marginal product of capital exceeds the time-
Figure 3













preference rate r if, and only if, the capital 
stock is less than the steady-state capital stock,
kE¢. Hence,
(10) Dc > 0 Û k < kE ¢.
In words, consumption will be increasing over
time if, and only if, the capital stock falls short
of its steady-state level. Intuitively, if capital is
scarce relative to labor, then the return on new
capital investment will be high, inducing house-
holds to sacrifice some current consumption in
exchange for higher future consumption.
In the top panel of Figure 3 we put an
upward-pointing arrow to the left of kE¢, reflect-
ing the fact that consumption will be increas-
ing over time whenever k < kE¢. Similarly, we
place a downward-pointing arrow to the right 
of kE¢. At kE¢ itself, we put a vertical line, labeled
Dc = 0, to indicate that here consumption tends
to neither rise nor fall.
We turn now to the dynamics of the capi-
tal stock. Equation 7 says that the capital stock
will tend to fall, over time, at points above the
curve y – g – dk in the top panel of Figure 2. At
points below the curve, the capital stock will
tend to increase. The intuition is that a level of
consumption that is high relative to the capital
stock can be achieved only by not replacing
capital equipment as it wears out. If, on the
other hand, consumption is low relative to the
capital stock, then there is more than enough
output left over (after meeting the demands of
households and the government) to replace
worn-out capital, and the capital stock rises
over time. In Figure 4, the y – g – dk curve is
relabeled as Dk = 0, and arrows are placed
above and below it, pointing to the left and
right, respectively.
Figure 5 combines Figures 3 and 4. In the
figure’s top panel, arrows show the directions
of consumption and capital movement for dif-
ferent levels of consumption and capital. Its
bottom panel shows how the after-tax interest
rate varies with the capital stock. As in Figure
2, the economy’s unique steady state is point
E ¢. In this steady state, r = r, k = kE ¢, and c = cE ¢
= f (kE ¢, n0) – g – dkE ¢. Point E¢ is called a sad-
dle-path equilibrium. For each initial capital
stock, there is a unique level of consumption
such that the economy will approach E ¢. Any
other initial consumption level would put the
economy on either an explosive or an implo-
sive path—a path that cannot be optimal.
14 In
the diagram, if the economy starts at some arbi-
trary capital stock kA < kE ¢, then households will
choose consumption level cA < cE ¢ and the 
economy will follow the dashed path from 
point  A toward point E ¢. As the capital stock
increases, the after-tax interest rate falls from rA
toward  r. Similarly, if the economy starts at
some capital stock kB < kE ¢, then households will
choose consumption level cB > cE ¢ and the 
economy will follow the dashed path from 
point  B toward  point  E ¢. The interest rate rises
from rB toward r.
The Effects of Tax Reform: The Short Run
Consider an economy in steady state
under an income tax. Suddenly, the income tax
is replaced with a consumption tax.
15 We know
that the economy starts at point E in the upper
panel of Figure 6, and eventually ends up at
point E ¢. What happens along the way? Our
phase diagram gives us the answer. We know
that point E ¢ is a saddle-point equilibrium under
the new tax system: there is a unique path 
for consumption and the capital stock that
simultaneously satisfies all of the utility and
profit maximization conditions and that is 
neither explosive nor implosive. This path runs
through E ¢, and movements along the path are
governed by the set of directional arrows
depicted in the figure. For any given initial capi-
tal stock, households will choose the level of
consumption that puts the economy on this
convergent path.
In the upper panel of Figure 6, the econ-
omy jumps downward from point E to point A
the instant that tax reform is put into effect.
Intuitively, the after-tax return on capital jumps
upward from r to rA = r/(1 – tp) with the switch
to a consumption tax. (In the lower panel of
Figure 6, the economy jumps upward from
point  E to point A.) The higher marginal return
to capital means that households are willing to
Figure 4
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take a cut in dividends (reduce their consump-
tion) in order that firms may finance the acqui-
sition of additional capital through higher
retained earnings. As the capital stock gradually
expands, the economy moves up the dashed
saddle path from point A toward point E ¢ in the
upper panel of Figure 6, and down the capital
demand curve from point A to point E ¢ in the
lower panel.
The pretax interest rate, R, is subject to
conflicting influences in the short run. In the 
initial steady state, R = r/(1 – td ). Immediately
after reform is implemented, R = rA = r/(1 – tp).
Thus, the before-tax interest rate will fall if, and
only if, tp < td. In fact, though, tp » 0.35 > 0.25
» td. Hence, the pretax interest will likely rise
by about 15 percent with the imposition of a
consumption tax before gradually declining to
its new steady-state level (r).
The immediate impact of tax reform on
stock prices also depends upon relative tax
rates. The steady-state level of stock prices
under an income tax is (1 – td )kE. Immediately
following the move to a consumption tax, the
level of stock prices is (1 – t)kE. If, as argued
























will fall by about 13 percent upon the imple-
mentation of tax reform. However, this result is
sensitive to changes in our assumptions about
the features of tax reform. For example, if exist-
ing payroll taxes are kept in place (so that the
consumption tax need only replace the revenue
from the current income tax), then the U.S.
Treasury estimates that t » 0.224. In this case,
stock prices would actually jump upward
slightly following tax reform. In any event, 
following their initial jump, stock prices vary
with the capital stock, gradually rising toward 
(1 – t)kE.
Finally, the pretax wage rate is linked to
the capital stock via the marginal product of
labor (Equation 8). Since the capital stock 
doesn’t jump, neither does the wage rate. As the
capital stock gradually increases, so does the
wage rate. Whether the after-tax wage rate
jumps upward or downward depends entirely
on the size of tw relative to t. Under our base-
case scenario, these tax rates are equal.
Consequently, the after-tax wage, like the pre-
tax wage, does not initially move.
An illustrative simulation of the effects of
fundamental tax reform is presented in the box.
Figure 6
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Table 1 summarizes our principal findings.
The first column of the table shows the imme-
diate impact that the adoption of a consumption
tax can be expected to have on each of several
variables. The second column shows the long-
run impact of tax reform. Ordinarily, when we
tax a good or activity, we expect to see less of
it in the marketplace. However, a tax on con-
sumption causes the economy to achieve a
higher level of consumption, in the long run,
than would be observed under an income tax.
The resolution of this paradox is that society
accumulates greater real wealth under a con-
sumption tax than it does under an income
tax—an accumulation that is made possible
because the initial effect of the consumption
tax is to reduce consumption.
Is the eventual increase in consumption
worth the initial decline? In the simple model
economy examined here, the answer is unam-
biguously yes. Because the supply of labor is
fixed in our model economy, the only compo-
nent of the income tax that is distortionary is the
profits tax: it reduces the demand for capital at
any given after-tax interest rate. Because the
consumption tax eliminates this distortion, it
necessarily raises social welfare.
The real world is obviously more com-
plicated than our model economy. Most per-
tinently, household labor supply is not
exogenously fixed: any tax on labor income 
distorts households’ labor–leisure choices. If
moving from an income tax to a consumption
tax significantly worsens this labor-market dis-
tortion, it may reduce social welfare despite the
fact that, at the same time, it eliminates an
investment-saving distortion.
Fortunately, it is relatively easy to explain
how the results obtained here would change,
qualitatively, if the supply of labor was endoge-
nous. We address this issue in Part 2 of our 
article. Part 2 also considers the sensitivity of
our results to capital adjustment costs and to a
specification of the production function that has
each firm’s output depend on the aggregate
capital stock as well as its own.
NOTES
1 Howitt and Sinn (1989) undertake a more sophisti-
cated analysis within a similar framework.
2 For simulation exercises that examine the impact of tax
reform on different age groups, see Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) and Auerbach (1996). Feenberg, Mitrusi,
and Poterba (1997) present a careful analysis of the
impact of tax reform on the distribution of consumption.
Sarkar and Zodrow (1993) discuss windfall gains and
losses resulting from tax reform and how they might be
mitigated. Monetary policy affects the distribution of
wealth primarily through unanticipated inflations, which
benefit debtors at the expense of lenders, and unan-
ticipated deflations, which have the opposite effect.
3 Hines (1996) contains a general discussion of compli-
cations that arise in an open-economy setting.
Mendoza and Tesar (1995) construct a formal model.
4 In otherwise identical models, the inclusion of a pre-
cautionary savings motive cuts the impact of tax
reform on output, consumption, and the capital stock
roughly in half.
5 According to the Federal Reserve Board’s flow of
funds accounts for the nonfarm, nonfinancial corporate
business sector, internal funds averaged 94.8 percent
of capital expenditures over the ten-year period from
1985 through 1994. In contrast, credit market borrow-
ing averaged only 32.5 percent of capital expenditures.
6 For more detailed descriptions of these alternative
approaches, see Koenig and Taylor (1996), Hall and
Rabushka (1996), Metcalf (1996), and Moore (1996).
7 We ignore human capital and the associated invest-
ment in education and training.
8 The statutory tax rate on corporate profits is 35 per-
cent. The tax rate on wage income can be obtained by
adding 14 percent (representing federal payroll taxes)
to the 22 percent marginal income tax rate reported in
Auerbach (1996). The actual tax rates on household
interest and dividend income are 22 percent and 27
percent, respectively (Auerbach 1996). For compari-
son, Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) obtain an esti-
mate of 32 percent for the U.S. corporate capital
income tax rate and an estimate of 34 percent for the
tax rate on U.S. labor income. Triest (1996) estimates a
38 percent average marginal tax rate on labor income.
Personal income tax deductions and exemptions that
are excluded from our model (and that would be elimi-
nated under most tax-reform proposals) account for
the relatively low revenue yield of the current system,
despite high marginal tax rates.
9 Triest’s (1996) estimate of the required flat-tax rate (39
percent) is somewhat higher than ours, but not much
different from his own estimate of the current average
marginal tax rate on labor income (38 percent).
10 The alert reader will have noted that the transition can
Table 1
Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform in the Basic Model
Variable Immediate impact Long-run impact
Output, capital 0 +
Consumption – +
After-tax interest rate + 0





Real wage 0 +
NOTES:
a Assumes that profits are currently taxed more heavily than is interest.
b Assumes that the new tax rate on corporate cash flow will exceed the current tax rate
on dividends.
c Assumes that (1 – t)kE¢ exceeds (1 – td)kE.36
be completed in a single step by setting tp = 0 and tw
= td º t¢. However, this approach breaks down in the
real world, where not every firm is able to finance its
capital investment out of its own retained earnings.
11 If 1 + rt > MRS(ct, ct +1), then it will be advantageous
to the household to reduce its period-t consumption by
one unit and buy a bond. Principal and interest on the
bond (received in period t + 1) will be more than
enough to compensate the household for the reduction
in ct. Similarly, if 1 + rt < MRS(ct, ct +1), then it will be
advantageous to the household to sell a bond from its
portfolio and use the proceeds to increase its period-t
consumption by one unit.
12 These estimates are meant to convey no more than the
likely order of magnitude of the economy’s response to
tax reform. They are sensitive to the assumed profits
tax rate and to the assumed capital-elasticity of output.
Other studies have generally reported a slightly
weaker baseline output response.
13 Moreover, we implicitly switch to a continuous-time
version of the model described above.
14 Think of a marble on a saddle. The surface of the sad-
dle looks like a U when viewed from the side and like
an inverted U when viewed from either end. The point
in the middle of the saddle is the steady state. A mar-
ble placed precisely at this point will remain stationary.
In principle, a marble placed at the exact middle of
one of the saddle’s ends will move toward the steady
state rather than fall off the saddle on either side.
15 For a gradual reform analysis, see Howitt and Sinn (1989).
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It will be useful to consider an example of an
economy as described in the main text, which will
enable us to quantify the responses to fundamental
tax reform. Consider an environment in which
households are identical and have preferences
described by a utility function of the form
å
¥
t = 1 log(ct)/(1 + r)t,
where ct is household consumption at time t, and r
is the pure rate of time preference. With this utility
function, the marginal rate of substitution between
current and future consumption [MRS(ct, ct + 1)] is
simply (1 + r)(ct + 1/ct ). Consistent with Equation 3,
the optimality condition 1 + rt = MRS(ct, ct + 1)
takes the form
where rt is the real after-tax interest rate.
We assume that production per household is
a simple function of capital per household: y = k q.
It follows that the marginal product of capital (MPk)
is qk q –1. Investment optimality conditions (Equa-
tions 5 and 5¢ for an economy with an income tax
and an economy with a consumption tax, respec-
tively) become
rt = (1 – tp)(qkt
q – 1 – d)
and
rt = qkt
q – 1 – d,
where d is the depreciation rate for capital and tp is
the corporate income tax rate. Finally, Equation 7,
which governs the evolution of the capital stock,
takes the form
kt +1 – kt = kt
q – ct – gt – dkt,
where gt denotes government purchases at time t.
We assume that a period is a quarter of a
year and let r = 0.01 and d = 0.02.These parame-
ter values imply that the average annual rate of
return on capital is just over 4 percent in steady
state, and the annualized depreciation rate is just
over 8 percent.The technology parameter, q, is set
equal to 0.35. Government purchases are constant
through time.
Figures A, B, and C show the response of 
the capital stock, consumption, and after-tax rate 
of return to fundamental tax reform. Initially, the
economy is assumed to be in steady state with a
corporate income tax rate of 35 percent. (Interest,
dividend, and wage taxes may also be in effect, but
these are irrelevant to our simulations.) Suddenly,
in period 0, the income tax is replaced by a con-
sumption tax. In the figures, the initial steady-state
levels of consumption and capital are normalized
to unity. As can be seen, convergence is fairly com-
plete after 100 periods, or 25 years. However, con-
sumption does not rise above its initial steady-state
level for 40 periods, or 10 years.The after-tax
annual interest rate jumps from 4.1 percent to
around 6.3 percent before gradually falling back to
its old level. As noted in the main text, the pretax
interest rate (not shown in the figures) may jump
upward or downward when tax reform is imple-
mented, depending upon the relative magnitudes 












profits. Assuming that interest income is initially
taxed at a 25 percent annual rate, tax reform would
see the pretax interest rate jump upward from 5.4
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